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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




The appellant, Aron Rosenberg, is a shareholder of 
Motient corporation. He has appealed from a District Court 
judgment dismissing, with prejudice, his shareholder 
derivative action against XM Ventures for failing to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint 
asserted a violation of section 16(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 resulting from XM Ventures' sale of 
Motient stock. 
 
The issue on this appeal requires us to determine 
whether beneficial ownership of a subject issuer's equity 
securities is a necessary element of group membership 
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within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. We conclude that it is. We have 
carefully considered the other issues presented by the 
Appellant and conclude that no extended discussion is 
necessary. As a result, we will affirm the Order of the 
District Court dismissing Rosenberg's Complaint. 1 
 
The specific question before us is whether beneficial 
ownership of the equity securities of a corporate issuer by 
each group member is a necessary element for entrance in 
a section 13(d) group. Put another way, may an individual 
without beneficial ownership of the equity securities of an 
issuer become a member of a group consisting of 
individuals who are beneficial owners of the issuer's equity 
securities for the purpose of determining whether the group 
members are statutory insiders subject to section 16(b) of 




Plaintiff-Appellant Aron Rosenberg appeals from the 
District Court's grant of Defendant-Appellee XM Ventures' 
motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6). We 
note from the outset that this case takes many twists and 
turns through the thicket of federal securities law. 
Therefore, we begin our trek, compass in hand, with the 
salient facts. Rosenberg is a shareholder of Motient, Inc. 
(Motient), a public company registered under section 12 of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C.S 78l 
(1994). Motient owned 80 percent of the outstanding shares 
of XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc. Another company, 
WorldSpace, Inc., owned the remaining shares of XM 
Holdings. 
 
Rosenberg alleges that "in or about mid 1999, Motient, 
its significant shareholders, and WorldSpace agreed that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court properly had jurisdiction based on 15 U.S.C. 
S 78aa. We have jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Appeal was 
timely filed under FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). In addition, we exercise plenary 
review of a District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Furthermore, we exercise plenary review over the interpretation of 
statutes. United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Motient would purchase WorldSpace's 20 % interest in 
AMRC [XM Holdings]." See App. at 15. Further, Rosenberg 
alleges that "various agreements, formal and informal, 
entered into by and between, Motient, XM, WorldSpace and 
Motient's significant shareholders, created a group which 
acted together for the purpose of acquiring, holding or 
voting the Company's [Motient's] Equity securities . . . [and] 
at all relevant times, that group included XM and owned 
more than 10 percent of the Company's [Motient's] 
outstanding Common Stock." Id. at 16. 
 
On June 7, 1999, Motient, XM Holdings, and WorldSpace 
entered into a formal Share Exchange Agreement. At 
bottom, the Agreement provided that WorldSpace would 
transfer all of its shares of XM Holdings to Motient in 
exchange for Motient's issuance of 8, 614, 244 shares of its 
own stock to an irrevocable grantor trust (XM Ventures) to 
be created by WorldSpace. The Agreement further provided 
that XM Ventures would transfer its XM Holdings stock to 
Motient; thereafter, Motient would issue its own stock to 
XM Ventures in two distributions. The transaction would 
result in XM Holdings being a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Motient, and XM Ventures, with the CEO of WorldSpace 
acting as trustee, would be a substantial shareholder of 
Motient. 
 
According to Rosenberg, between September 1999 and 
February 2000, XM sold a portion of the Motient shares 
that it acquired under the Agreement. Rosenberg filed the 
present action, contending that XM must disgorge the 
profits it realized on these trades to Motient pursuant to 
section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
See 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1994). In response to Rosenberg's 
complaint, XM filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 
The District Court granted XM's motion to dismiss, with 
prejudice, partially on the ground that XM was not a 
member of a group that owned more than a 10 percent 
beneficial interest in Motient equity securities prior to XM's 
acquisition of Motient Stock. App. at 141. In opposing XM's 
motion to dismiss, Rosenberg argued, among other things, 
that WorldSpace acted as XM's agent because "it is 
reasonable to infer . . . that XM specifically requested that 
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the Group be formed to insure XM's acquisition of the 
additional shares." App. at 149. The District Court rejected 
this argument, concluding that "a critical flaw in this 
argument is the fact that WorldSpace, whether as principal 
or agent, could not have been a member of an ownership 
group prior to the purchase because it never owned any 
Motient stock prior to the transaction in question." Id. We 
write to clarify the District Court's conclusion on this point 
because it could be interpreted as requiring record 
ownership of an equity security as a prerequisite to 




To answer the question before us on this appeal properly, 
we are required to interpret provisions of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. S 78a, et. seq. (1994). 
Therefore, we begin by briefly setting forth the general 
analytical framework underlying our construction of the 
provision at issue. The role of the courts in interpreting a 
statute is to give effect to Congress's intent. See Idahoan 
Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d 
Cir. 1998), citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 
(1993). Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its 
intent through the ordinary meaning of its language, every 
exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an 
examination of the plain language of the statute. See id. at 
202, citing, Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. v. Segal (In re Segal), 
57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 
490 U.S. 581 (1989)); United States v. Pelullo,  14 F.3d 881, 
903 (3d Cir. 1994). Where the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required. See In re 
Segal, 57 F.3d at 346. To determine whether the statutory 
language is ambiguous, we must examine "the language 
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, 
and the broader context of the statute as a whole." See 
Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192-93 (3d. Cir. 
2001), quoting, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 
(1997). In addition, when interpreting a statute, courts 
should endeavor to give meaning to every word which 
Congress used and therefore should avoid an interpretation 
which renders an element of the language superfluous. See 
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United States v. State of Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997), reh'g 
denied, 521 U.S. 1144 (1997); United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 
544, 550 (1996) (reading which gives effect to all of a 
statute's provisions prevails over one which disregards a 
provision as legislative oversight); First Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 
FDIC, 79 F.3d 362, 367 (3d Cir. 1996). This precept of 
statutory construction applies to the interpretation of 
regulations as well. See Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple 
Investor Fund, LP, 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995) (court's 
construction should give effect to all provisions); LaVallee 
Northside Civic Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone 
Management Comm'n, 866 F.2d 616, 623 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(court should endeavor to reconcile conflicting statute and 
regulation). Thus, the preferred construction of a statute 
and its regulations is one that gives meaning to all 
provisions. See United States v. Higgins, 128 F.3d 138, 142 
(3d Cir. 1997). With these principles in mind, we turn our 
attention to the Act. 
 
A. Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
       1934. 
 
Before we begin our analysis, however, we will provide 
context by setting forth the statutory provision that gives 
rise to liability in this case. Section 16(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that any profit realized 
by a corporation's principal stockholders arising from the 
purchase and sale of a corporation's equity securities 
within a period of less than six months must be disgorged 
to the corporation. See 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1994); Foremost- 
Mckesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976). 
We mention in passing that we are not concerned with 
section 16(b) liability as it applies to corporate officers and 
directors. Here, we address section 16(b) liability 
specifically as it relates to the principal stockholders of a 
corporation in a purchase-sale sequence. 
 
The principal stockholders of a corporation are those 
shareholders who directly or indirectly beneficially own 
more than ten percent of the corporation's equity securities. 
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991). From these 
precepts, it is clear that liability will attach under section 
16(b) when an individual having beneficial ownership of 
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more than 10 percent of any one class of the issuer's equity 
securities both purchases and sells shares of the issuer 
within six months. See, e.g., Feder v. Frost 220 F.3d 29, 32 
(2d Cir. 2000) quoting Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, 
156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1998). In other words, an 
individual will not be liable as a principal stockholder 
under section 16(b) for buying and selling stock within six 
months of each other unless prior to the purchase he 
beneficially owns more than ten percent of the equity 
securities of a corporation. Having explained when liability 
will attach to a beneficial owner of securities under section 
16(b) for certain trading activity, we now turn to a 
discussion of exactly who can be a beneficial owner, within 
the meaning of section 16, of equity securities. 
 
B. Beneficial Ownership of Equity Securities . 
 
Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
does not specifically define beneficial ownership with 
respect to determining the principal stockholders of a 
subject issuer. See 15 U.S.C. S 78p(a) (1994). Rather, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the agency 
authorized by Congress to implement the statute, 
promulgated rules in 1991 prescribing the contours of 
beneficial ownership under section 16 for the purpose of 
determining whether a person is a beneficial owner of more 
than 10 percent of a class of equity security. See Feder, 
220 F.3d at 33, see also Ownership Reports and Trading by 
Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242 
(Feb. 21, 1991). The relevant rule states that "the term 
`beneficial owner' for purposes of section 16(b) shall mean 
any person who is deemed a beneficial owner pursuant to 
section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
and the rules thereunder." 17 C.F.R. S 240.16a-1(a)(1) 
(2000). In substance, the SEC merely engrafted section 
13(d)'s definition of beneficial ownership onto section 16. 
We note here, however, that the term "beneficial owner" has 
another definition under Rule 16a-1(a)(2) that is used to 
determine the particular securities held by a beneficial 
owner after it has been determined that the beneficial 
owner is an insider subject to short swing recovery. See 17 
C.F.R. S 240.16a-1(a)(2). Here, we do not pass upon this 
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rule. Because, as we have already noted, section 16 defines 
beneficial ownership, for the purpose of determining who is 
a principal shareholder, by reference to section 13(d) of the 
`34 Act, we turn now, as we must, to an examination of 
beneficial ownership under section 13(d). 
 
Section 13(d) is essentially a reporting provision that 
requires the disclosure of certain information to the SEC, 
the issuing entity, and the exchanges where the stock is 
traded. See 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d)(1)(D) (1994). It provides as 
follows: 
 
       (d) Reports by persons acquiring more than five per 
       centum of certain classes of securities. 
 
       (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or 
       indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity 
       security . . . shall, within ten days after such 
       acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its 
       principal executive office, by registered or certified 
       mail, send to each exchange where the security is 
       traded, and filed with the Commission, a statement 
       containing such of the following information, and such 
       additional information, as the Commission may by 
       rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or 
       appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
       of investors -- (A) the background, and identity, 
       residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of such 
       beneficial ownership by, such person and all other 
       persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases 
       have been or are to be effected; 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78m(d)(1) (1994). The text of this provision is 
clear on its face. After a person has acquired beneficial 
ownership of the relevant security, the person is required to 
file a report with various entities within 10 days. We 
observe that the heading of the subsection speaks in terms 
of a person who acquires beneficial ownership of a security. 
Next, we turn to the regulation promulgated by the SEC to 
implement this provision. SEC Rule 13d-3 provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
       (a) for the purposes of sections 13(d) . . . of the Act a 
       beneficial owner of a security includes any person 
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       who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, 
       arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise 
       has or shares: (1) Voting power which includes the 
       power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such security; 
       and/or, (2) investment power which includes the power 
       to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such 
       security. 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.13d-3 (2000) (emphasis added). Clearly, 
Rule 13d-3 casts a wide net in prescribing the sorts of 
activity that will qualify one as a beneficial owner of an 
equity security. Indeed, our sister circuits and various 
commentators have noted that in determining who is a 
beneficial owner of securities section 13d-3 focuses on the 
person who can actually vote the shares, rather than the 
record owner of the stock. See, e.g., Calvary Holdings, Inc., 
v. Chandler, 948 F.2d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that 
record owner of stock was not a beneficial owner of the 
stock because he did not have the power to vote or dispose 
of the stock without the permission of others); GAF Corp. v. 
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 910 (1972) (noting that voting control of stock is the 
only relevant element of beneficial ownership); Bath Indus., 
v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 112 (7th Cir. 1970) (noting that legal 
title is irrelevant for the purpose of the statute if someone 
else can guarantee a block of votes). The Rule, textually at 
least, like the statute it implements, is clear with respect to 
the type of activity that will qualify one as a beneficial 
owner of securities. Further, in casting its net, the Rule 
defines a beneficial owner as a person with certain 
attributes. 
 
C. Group Beneficial Ownership. 
 
Finally, we come to the crux of the matter before us-- 
whether an entity can be a member of a group of beneficial 
owners without first beneficially owning stock itself. To 
answer that question, we direct our attention to section 
13(d)(3) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which 
outlines the contours of a "group." See  15 U.S.C. 
S 78m(d)(3) (1994); Morales v. Freund, 163 F.3d 763, 766 
(1999). It has been noted by the only other court 
specifically addressing the issue before us that neither 
section 13(d)(3), its regulations, nor its congressional 
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commentary provides a clear answer with respect to the 
question before us. See Transcon Lines v. Becker , 470 F. 
Supp. 356, 372-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). We agree. After 
considering the text and its contextual relevance, both 
narrowly and in relation to the statute as a whole, we 
believe that the statute, the regulations, and the 
accompanying legislative history are ambiguous with 
respect to the specific question before us. It is true that 
elements of the language of the various statutes and 
regulations may, when read in isolation, support each 
party's position. In fact, in the case sub judice each party 
has cited to particular snippets of text from the statute, 
regulations, or legislative history that tends to support each 
side's respective construction. As we have previously stated, 
however, we do not base our construction of a statute, 
complex or not, on a sentence or two taken from volumes 
of statutory text, regulations, and legislative history. 
 
The relevant text of section 13(d)(3) provides that"when 
two or more persons act as a partnership, limited 
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, 
such syndicate or group shall be deemed a person  for the 
purposes of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d)(3) (1994) 
(emphasis added). This provision has the effect of 
aggregating the individual stock beneficially owned by each 
group member and attributing to each member the total 
holdings of the group. See, e.g., Morales v. Quintel 
Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2001). For 
example, if a group has three members each owning ten 
shares of stock, then each member will be treated as 
beneficially owning thirty shares of stock. Here, when 
defining a group, Congress chose to speak in terms of a 
person or persons acting for an enumerated purpose. 
 
The implication of using the term "person" in subsection 
(d)(3) after its use in subsection (d)(1), which defines 
beneficial ownership, indicates to us that Congress 
intended to attribute the same meaning to person as it had 
in the preceding subsection defining beneficial ownership. 
In other words, the "persons" that subsection (d)(3) refers to 
are the same "persons" that Congress set forth in 
subsection (d)(1)--beneficial owners. We simply fail to see 
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why Congress would specifically state that the group shall 
be deemed a person if Congress did not intend to refer to 
persons as that term is used throughout the section. 
 
Moreover, the Rule promulgated by the SEC to implement 
section 13(d)(3) provides support for this construction. Rule 
13d-5 defines group beneficial ownership in pertinent part: 
 
       When two or more persons agree to act together for the 
       purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of 
       equity securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby 
       shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership 
       for purposes of sections 13(d) . . . of the Act, as of the 
       date of such agreement, of all equity securities of that 
       issuer beneficially owned by any such persons . 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 
Keeping in mind the canon of construction that we must 
give effect to all the provisions of a statute or regulation, we 
conclude that the "persons" Rule 13d-5 speaks of are 
persons as that term is used in Rule 13d-3. To conclude 
otherwise would require us to disregard not only the text of 
the statutory provisions and the regulations promulgated 
under them, but also the context in which the provisions 
are used. Specifically, reading section 13(d)(3) and its 
regulations without acknowledging the meaning of"person" 
that Congress previously attributed to it in section 13(d)(1) 
would require us to read section 13(d)(3) in isolation. This 
we cannot do. 
 
As a result, we construe the Rule to mean that when two 
or more beneficial owners agree to act together for one of 
the statutorily enumerated purposes the group formed 
would be deemed to be a beneficial owner of all of the 
securities held by its members. It necessarily follows from 
this precept, by negative implication, that one who does not 
have beneficial ownership of the equity securities of an 
issuer cannot be a member of a group of individuals that do 
have beneficial ownership. 
 
Our construction is supported by section 13(d)'s 
legislative history and the early cases construing section 
13(d). The legislative history accompanying section 13(d)(3) 
provides in pertinent part: 
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       Paragraph (3) of subsection (d) defines `person' as 
       follows: `when two or more persons act as a 
       partnership, limited partnership . . . or other group . . . 
       such syndicate or group shall be deemed a `person' for 
       the purposes of this subsection.' This provision would 
       prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their voting 
       or other interests in the securities of an issuer from 
       evading the provisions of the statute because no one 
       individual owns more than 10 percent of the securities. 
       The group would be deemed to have become the 
       beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of more than 10 
       percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed 
       to act in concert. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711 at 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2818 (emphasis added). Two observations are apparent. 
First, in the sentence immediately following the definition of 
"person," the commentary explains that the purpose of the 
provision is to prevent groups of persons from evading the 
statute. It would seem to us then, that in explaining its 
purpose, Congress used the term "person" in the same 
context that it defined the term "person" in the statutory 
scheme. We simply fail to see why Congress would 
suddenly depart from using its previous definition of 
"person" when explaining what the provision was designed 
to combat. Next, the commentary makes it clear that 
Congress was concerned about aggregations of beneficial 
owners coming together to form a group when it stated that 
the "provision would prevent a group of persons who seek 
to pool their voting or other interests in the securities of an 
issuer." The implication is, of course, that each member of 
the group must have something to "pool". The commentary 
first gives the example of voting interests. Obviously, under 
the statutory definition of beneficial owner in section 
13(d)(1) if one has voting interests of an equity security, one 
is a beneficial owner of the security. The commentary 
explains that it would prevent persons from pooling"other 
interests" in an issuer's securities. We believe that the 
"other interests" Congress referred to are contained in the 
second prong of section 13(d)(1)'s definition of beneficial 
ownership--the power to dispose of the security or the 
power to direct the disposition of the security. 
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Here, it would also seem that Congress did not intend to 
expand upon the scope of activity that encompasses 
beneficial ownership beyond that used in the previous 
subsection, because in discussing the provision's intended 
function, Congress did not add anything to its previous 
definition of a beneficial owner. We therefore conclude that 
the legislative history accompanying section 13(d) manifests 
Congress' intent that an individual must be a beneficial 
owner of an issuer's securities prior to becoming a member 
of a section 13(d) "group." 
 
As a final aid to our inquiry, we now turn to the caselaw 
interpreting section 13(d). To our knowledge, the precise 
issue presented by this appeal has yet to be addressed by 
an appellate court. Indeed, it has been specifically 
addressed by only one district court. See Transcon Lines v. 
A.G. Becker Inc., 470 F.Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting 
that the precise question is not clearly answered by the 
statute, its regulations, or legislative history). We observe, 
however, that the Transcon court did not engage in a 
thorough textual analysis, as we have here, of section 13(d) 
before concluding that beneficial ownership is a necessary 
prerequisite for entrance into a group. See id . at 374. 
 
On the other hand, though not confronted with the 
precise issue before us, there are a number of appellate 
court decisions that lend additional support for our 
construction of section 13(d). In an early case construing 
the requirements of section 13(d), the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that "section 13(d) should be interpreted to 
require compliance with its disclosure provisions when, but 
only when, any group of stockholders owning more  than 10 
percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation agree 
to act . . . ." See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot , 427 F.2d 97 (7th 
Cir. 1970). The D.C. Circuit likewise rejected the argument 
that a defendant could not be a group member because he 
"lacked involvement" with the issuing corporation because 
the defendant had a "substantial interest in the corporation 
by virtue of his individual stock holdings prior to becoming 
a group member." See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 
1149, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Similarly, in affirming a 
District Court's finding of liability against a defendant for 
failing to file a Schedule 13D, the Second Circuit noted that 
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it had to evaluate the record to determine whether there 
was sufficient evidence to conclude that an understanding 
existed between the defendant and others holding beneficial 
ownership of more than 5 percent of the stock. See 
Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363 (1982) (emphasis 
added). Thereafter, the court determined that each member 
of the alleged group had beneficial ownership of the issuing 
corporation's shares prior to becoming a group member. Id. 
See also Morales, 249 F.3d at 123 (stating that"S13(d) 
encompasses not only the isolated shareholder who 
accumulates shares of a corporation's common stock, but 
also a group of shareholders who undertake the same 
activity as part of a collective effort."). Thus, the various 
authorities cited above, while construing other aspects of 
group membership, all seemed to assume, a fortiori, that 
each individual member of the group must have beneficial 
ownership of the securities of the issuing entity prior to 
becoming a group member. As a result, based upon the 
statutory and regulatory text, relevant legislative history, 
and caselaw from our sister circuits, we conclude that for 
the purpose of determining who is a principal stockholder 
under section 16 of the `34 Act, each member of a section 
13(d) group must hold beneficial ownership of the shares of 





Having determined that membership in a section 13(d) 
group is contingent upon each member of the group 
holding beneficial ownership of the securities of the issuer 
in question, we now turn to Rosenberg's argument. In his 
opening brief, Rosenberg states that "section 13(d) does not 
require a member of a 13(d) group to beneficially own 
common stock of the subject issuer prior to its entry into 
such a group." See Appellant's Opening Brief at 15. Then, 
in an abrupt about face, Rosenberg, in his reply brief, 
argues that "Beneficial Ownership . . . Is the Necessary 
Element for membership in a group." See Appellant's Reply 
Brief at 1. Therefore, we will proceed on the basis that 
Rosenberg has conceded that membership in a 13(d) group 
is predicated upon each member of the group holding 
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beneficial ownership of the subject issuer's stock prior to 
becoming a group member. Since we agree with the District 
Court that XM did not exist before July 7, 1999, we need 
not address Rosenberg's group membership arguments 
with regard to XM. 
 
Rosenberg, however, does not stop with XM. He also 
argues that the District Court erred by denying his request 
to amend his Complaint by adding WorldSpace as a 
Defendant. Appellant's Opening Brief at 15. In this vein, 
Rosenberg argues that WorldSpace was a group member by 
virtue of its entering into the stockholder agreement on 
June 7, 1999, with Motient's majority shareholders. 
Significantly, Rosenberg does not allege, nor could he on 
the record presented to us, that WorldSpace was, at any 
time prior to the transaction in issue, a beneficial owner of 
Motient Stock. As a result, we fail to see how WorldSpace 
could have been a section 13(d) group member. Indeed, 
based on our construction of section 13(d) and its 
regulatory provisions, WorldSpace, as a matter of law, 
could not have been a member of such a group precisely 
because it did not have beneficial ownership of any Motient 
shares prior to the formation of the section 13(d) group. 
 
The consequence of our conclusion that WorldSpace, as 
a matter of law, could not have been a section 13(d) group 
member is that WorldSpace could not, in light of our 
agreement with the District Court's other findings, have 
violated section 16(b) because it was not a statutory insider 
of Motient before the purchase of Motient stock occurred. 
We note in passing that our disposition of this case makes 
it unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether 
WorldSpace became a beneficial owner of Motient shares 




To recapitulate, we have concluded that, for the purpose 
of determining who is a principal stockholder under section 
16 of the `34 Act, each member of a section 13(d) group 
must hold beneficial ownership of the equity securities of 
the issuing entity prior to its entry into such a group. 
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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